Does the Green Movement Stop at the Green Line?

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Abstract:

This paper analyzes if the Israeli environmental movement's activities cease at the Green Line separating Israel from the West Bank. A literature review and series of personal interviews were conducted. The results of this primary research were analyzed and then categorized into four main arguments: security, humanitarian, public relations and transformative. The security argument states that challenging the security interest one environmental grounds is too controversial/difficult and therefore the environmental movement stops at the green line. The human rights argument infers that privileging the environment over human rights dissuades members of the environmental movement from working beyond the Green Line. The public relations argument rationalizes that if the environmental movement addresses the Barrier this could be perceived as being too political and therefore result in negative public relations. The only argument that posits the green movement does not stop at the Green Line is the transformative argument, which implies that the capacities under which the environmental movement can operate change beyond the Green Line, and therefore the work of the movement changes.

Introduction

Context

  The Second Intifada began in late September 2000. During the first twelve months of the Second Intifada, there was an increase in violence from both Palestinians and Israelis. Between October 2000 and July 2005, 138 suicide bombings took place in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza (Brym & Araj, 2006). "In direct response to this murderous onslaught, the Government of Israel, in April 2002 approved the plans for the construction of the fence as a non-violent and temporary measure of last resort" (Government of Israel, 2004). As stated by the Israeli government, the fence was intended to be a defensive measure to protect against suicide bombings and other attacks against Israelis and non-Israelis. Israel has declared its commitment to the removal of the fence should an agreement be reached by the two sides and the terrorist threat has been eliminated. The Israeli government points to previous precedence in the removal of border fences in the context of peace agreements/other arrangements including those with Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon (Government of Israel, 2004).

  The Palestinian Authority has regarded the construction of the barrier as a tactical move aimed at predefining future state boundaries, gaining control over natural resources, and restricting Palestinian power in the region. "Most accounts treat the wall as a technology of occupation, separation, or security" (Alatout, 2009). Despite the discordant viewpoints regarding the construction of the Barrier, construction came to fruition and currently continues.

Terminology

  The typical jargon used to define the Barrier is contingent upon the state/entity. Israelis commonly use the term "security fence" and Palestinians call the system a "separation wall" (Government of Israel, 2004). For the purposes of this paper, the more general term, "the Barrier", will be used.

Description of Barrier

  The Barrier route was determined by "security and operation considerations, examining topography, population density, and threat assessments and taking into account humanitarian, archeological and environmental concerns" (The State of Israel, 2007). Upon completion, the Barrier will vaguely follow the 1949 Green Line (or

Armistice Line), which defined the boundaries of the West Bank[1], with 85% of the Barrier route running inside the West Bank (UNRWA, 2012). The area between the 1949 border and the Barrier is referred to as "The Seam Zone", and is a closed military area.

The Barrier's planned route is estimated to be 708km when completed (The State of Israel, 2007). As of June 2012, 438Km (or 61.8%) is currently completed. Of the fence constructed so far 8.8km (or less than 5%) is made of concrete blocks, and the rest of the Barrier is comprised of wire fences with access and crossing points. When finished, 6%, or 30km, of the Barrier will be made of solid concrete. The purpose of the solid barrier system is "to prevent sniper fire in Israel and on major highways and roads. In this case, a solid concrete wall resembling a highway sound barrier often used in the US and Europe is erected. This design is used mainly …in densely populated urban areas such as Jerusalem" (The State of Israel, 2007). The solid concrete blocks are 8m high and 3m in width.

The remaining segments of the Barrier are a multi-layered composite obstacle comprised of "a ditch and a pyramid shaped stack of six coils of barbed wire on the eastern side of the structure, barbed wire only on the western side" (The State of Israel, 2007). The obstacle also includes a footpath for Israeli Defense Force patrols, an intrusion detection system comprised of sensors, and a smoothed strip of sand for footprint exposure.

Environmental Impact

In comparison to the limited land area of Israel, there is an extensive range of biodiversity found in the region. Israel is located at the apex of two distinct bioregions, desert and temperate arid Mediterranean zone. This translates to 2,780 plant species, 7 amphibian, 97 reptile, 511 bird and 116 mammal species found within the territory (Ministry of the Environment, 1997).

In the construction of the Barrier, Israel noted that "landscape architects were part of the planning team and their recommendations were taken into account in the decision making process concerning the route, in order to minimize damage to the landscape and

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[1] The Green Line denotes the 1949 Armistice Agreements between Israel and the neighboring countries of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. It also marks the territories that were captured in the Six-Day War, including the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights and Sinai Peninsula.

its vegetation" (The State of Israel, 2007). However, there is no record of an environmental impact assessment for the project being conducted. In spite of this oversight, it was mentioned on the Israeli Government's webpage dedicated to the Barrier that:

> The area of the Security Fence is abundant with olive trees, vital for the Palestinian farmer's living. A built in mechanism in the construction work provides for the uprooting and relocation of these trees to areas where they can continue to grow and be cultivated and, at the same time not leaving the area barren…Attention has been paid to water reservoirs, wells and pipes and accordingly, rusty pipes have been replaced by new ones and laid down underneath the Security Fence so that they will not be damaged. Special attention has been paid to the restoration of the area and once earthwork has been completed, restoration activity took place in order to restore the area to its former state, as much as possible (The State of Israel, 2007)

According the UN Barrier Monitoring Unit, an organization established in part to analyze the environmental impacts of the Barrier's construction, the Barrier has resulted in "land degradation, fragmentation of ecosystems, erosion and compaction of soil, heaping up of earthwalls, arbitrary disposal of waste, and accumulation of dust on agricultural lands and trees. These results impact the productivity of lands and often severely diminish the agricultural production and income of Palestinian Farmers" (UNRWA, 2012). The amalgamation of these impacts severely infringes upon the biological community. An environmental impact survey conducted found that the Barrier restricted animal movement (including seasonal migration and ability to reach water resources), increased overgrazing due the shrinkage of land area, fragmented ecological corridors, and affected plant survival and distribution (on both sides of the Barrier) (Abdallah, T. and Swaileh, K, 2011).

These impacts further exacerbate the ecological impacts already impairing the region. Beginning in 1997, Israel identified habitat fragmentation as the leading problem facing nature conservation (Ministry of the Environment, 1997). Habitat fragmentation is one of the many effects that will be exacerbated by increasing pressure from development, specifically infrastructure expansion.

Problem Statement

The axiom "the environment knows no boundaries" is common vernacular in environmental conflict literature. It typifies the battle between environmentalists and politicians fighting over transboundary resource issues. That is to say, the environment does not act according to political boundaries.

However, the Barrier isn't just a political boundary. This tangible border challenges previously conceived notions of the environmental risks in Israel. Israel is typically described as a geographic region that is too small for macroenvironmental risks to exist (Shmueli, 2008). As a result of this limited geographic disposition, environmental problems, such as air pollution from Haifa Bay Oil Refinery, are felt throughout the country. The construction of the Barrier promulgates new environmental challenges for this already confined region.

It becomes apparent that the Barrier is not just a security mechanism but also has a significant impact on the environment. However, the Barrier has only garnered considerable attention for its humanitarian concerns, most of which are derived from environmental issues (including sanitation, waste disposal, access to water and pollution problems).

The environmental movement in Israel is the largest of Israel's civil society movements (Tal, 2011). With a tremendous amount of success and power, it would fall well within the movement's confines to address the significant environmental hazards placed by the barrier. However, the Barrier remains absent from any leading Israeli environmental organization's agenda. This propagates the question; does the Israeli green movement stop at the Green Line?

Background

An ecological movement that stands for Earth alone and ignores class and other social inequalities will succeed at best in displacing environmental problems, meanwhile reinforcing the dominant relations of power in global capitalism, with their bias towards the unlimited commodification of human productive energy land and the built environment, and the ecology of the planet itself (Foster, 1998:188).

The objective of the environmental movement is two fold: the enhancement and protection of the environment and a general concern for the long-term viability of the physical and biological (Hays, 1981). These objectives are often accomplished by attempting to restrict environmentally harmful effects of federal agency sponsored activities. Achieving these goals is often pursued through environmental campaigns that make an indirect impact through direct means (De-Shalit, 2001). The impression made on the public by the action should bring about an amendment in government politics.

Globally, it is theorized that there have been three phases of development for the environmental movement (S. Sadeh, personal interview, July 30, 2012). The first phase was nature conservation, and produced organizations such as the Sierra Club. The second phase was the scientific approach to nature, or an attempt to conserve nature through technological development. This phase coincides with the addition of experts, scientists and legal, to many environmental organizations. The final phase is sustainability, in which the environment and man are viewed in an inseparable way.

As of 2011, there were over 98 active environmental organizations in Israel (Tal, 2011). Israel's high density of environmental organizations is reflective of the strong correlation between the development of the country and the development of an environmental movement[2]. The Society for the Protection of Nature in Israel (SPNI) was the first environmental group to form in Israel, five years after the country's establishment in 1948 and was highly representational of the nature conservation phase of the environmental movement (Tal, 2002). As the first, and only environmental organization in Israel until the 1970s, SPNI grew to be synonymous with the environmental movement. As the country began to grow and diversify, so did the environmental movement, leading into the scientific phase of environmental movement. The environmental movement's modern manifestation is estimated to be 20 years old, and it has been postulated that it has not yet reached the third phase of sustainability (S. Sadeh, personal interview, July 30, 2012).

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[2] The green movement (lower case) as used in this paper, refers to the civil society movement. This is to be distinguished from The Green Movement (capital letters) a social-environmental political party in Israel established in 2008.

Comprising the majority of Israel's environmental organizations are Non-Government Organizations (NGOs). NGOs have developed a unique niche in the field of environmental politics. It has been demonstrated that these groups have influence over the environmental protection of everything from the oceans and the ozone layer, and have assisted in national compliance with international mandates (Wapner, 1995). Unlike citizen activists, environmental NGOs utilize their resources in order to frame the context of the environmental movement, and guide the debate. It is the objective of these environmental activists to use this framework, specifically, science, to convince states of the need of policies that can mitigate environmental destruction (Epstein, 2005). They have the ability to disseminate information to a targeted audience, to apply pressure, to steer negotiations, and to turn objectives into action (Gehring, 1994; Haas, 1992). Chaitin translated these qualities into four categories of environmental NGOs:

a. Campaign: the purpose is to mobilize its members and the public

b. Expert: provides consultation services and publicly disseminates information

c. Humanitarian: have ethical-practical orientation and support people in need

d. Grassroots: self-organizing citizens undertake local, national, regional and international projects.

These categories are non-exclusive, and NGOs often can be classified as one or more of the aforementioned types. The most prevalent environmental organization, SPNI, is an example of a campaign and expert organization. A recent survey of the environmental movement in Israel identified environmental NGOs acting in all four categories (Tal, 2011).

Of significant importance in the Israeli Environmental Movement is the number of transnational NGOs. The work of these organizations is particularly important, due to their ability shape public affairs by working within and between societies (Wapner, 1995). Transnational NGOs operating in Israel, such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, have a unique ability to work in a different capacity than national NGOs. When they fail to change state behavior, they have the option to work through transnational economic, social and cultural networks in order to reach their objectives. Networks comprising these NGOs, along with citizen activists, have an established precedence of operating as a source of international change (Keck & Sikkink, 1998).

Objectives

The objective of this paper is to provide an analysis of the green movement's response to the Barrier constructed along the West Bank. This is illustrated through the presentation of 4 options for why or why not the green movement has addressed the environmental impacts of the Barrier. The four options were constructed through a literature review and personal interviews with members of the green movement.

An analysis of the validity of these options is provided and followed by a recommendation on how the to address the environmental impacts posed by the parts of the Barrier still to be constructed, as well as how to deal with the Barrier upon its completion.

Options

1) The Security Argument: Challenging the security interest on environmental grounds is too controversial/difficult

2) The Human Rights Argument: Privileging the environment over the human rights concerns dissuades members of the environmental movement

3) The Public Relations Argument: Addressing the Barrier as an environmental concern may be categorized as being too political and could result in negative public relations

4) The Transformative Argument: The environmental movement does not stop at the Green Line. Instead, the capacities under which the environmental movement can operate have changed, and therefore the work of the movement changes.

Analysis

The green movement's reasoning for not addressing the ecological problems over the Green Line is as multifaceted as the conflict within the region. The original statement regarding the issue when the Barrier began construction was that "there was too much work to do at home, and although Arab citizens of Israel were aware of Palestinian complaints, the problems were deemed insurmountable" (Tal, 2002). It has now been 10 years since the Barrier's construction first began, and the environmental hazards it imposed have increased. In the past 10 years there has been a change in the political climate, and a relative lull in terrorism. Therefore the previous rationale by the

environmental movement for not addressing the barrier has been replaced with new reasoning for not exerting interest in the Barrier's environmental impacts.

The Security Argument

The Security Argument is engrained in Israeli political rhetoric. Its premise is that any challenge to the Barrier, be it construction or activity beyond the Barrier, will be dismissed based on the Israeli Government's over-riding concern with security. The assumption that security will prevail over an environmental objective is cited as the primary reason for why the environmental movement does not address the environment impact of the Barrier.

Often the gravity of a security situation is exaggerated for rhetorical purposes (De-Shalit, 2001). In Israel, the security argument has a long, divisive history that originated prior to Israel's emancipation and has undergone numerous transformations since (Naor, 1999). Over time, this security concern has shaped Israeli policies on land allocation and use, thereby influencing the concept of environmental justice[3] in Israel (Shmueli, 2008). This phenomenon is not exclusive to Israel. Security often becomes the main preoccupation of a society's members currently engaged in conflict and serves a significant function in any decisions made by the society (Bar-Tal, 1998).

Shaher Sadeh's analysis of green movement's involvement beyond the green line in 2007 reached a general conclusion that "when a serious security interest emerged, challenging it on environmental grounds was considered too controversial for significant protest" (Sadeh, 2010). This is a sentiment that has been echoed in numerous pieces of journalism, research and by members of the environmental movement (C. Lubanov, personal interview, May 15 2012; E.Shwartz, personal interview, May 15, 2012).

However, there are two significant exceptions that challenge Sadeh's conclusion. In 2007, SPNI asked then Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to stop construction of the Barrier in the Judean Desert expressing concern over ecological fragility in the region. Their request was not only heard, it was approved. This decision could be reflective of the political climate at the time. The prevailing Defense Minister, Amir Perezt, was well

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[3] Environmental Justice is defined by the United States Environmental Protection Agency as: "the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, sex, national origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies" ("Environmental Justice Program and Civil Rights". Environmental Protection Agency. Retrieved 27 July 2012).

known to provide leniency towards environmental issues. However, the security concern was proven when the region in which the barrier was not constructed was infiltrated and a terrorist attack resulted. The environmental risk was then determined to be less important, and construction of the Barrier as proposed was implemented.

Another objection to the Barrier was conjured by the Israeli Union for Environmental Defense (IUED)[4] in 2005. Illegal dumping of construction waste has been a growing problem in Israel, with the majority of waste being disposed of across the Green Line, or in minority communities (Rinat, 2012). The IUED, in conjunction with B'tselem[5], argued that it was against international law for waste to be transported and disposed of across the Green Line (Waldoks, 2010). The case went to the Supreme Court, in which the contested action was suspended.

The Security Argument is a valid explanation for deterrence against raising environmental claims regarding the Barrier. However, the argument, and those who purport it, rests solely on the claim that the environmental movement should not be fighting Barrier construction. The security argument has failed to provide rationale for how to respond to the environmental impacts posed following the Barrier's completion. Additionally, the cases initiated by SPNI and IUED are indicative that an environmental challenge to the Barrier can surpass a security concern.

The Human Rights Argument

The most commonly publicized problem with the Barrier is humanitarian related concerns. For example, it has been observed that the Barrier's construction will leave the majority of the ground water wells, the historic source of fresh water for Palestinians, in the seam zone between the Barrier and the Green Line, thereby rendering them inaccessible to the majority of Palestinians (Tamimi, 2011). This renders a new problem of water access, which is a fundamental human right, according the United Nations[6].

The challenge posed in the human rights argument, as stated by Eran Ben-Yemini, a founder of Israel's Green Movement political party, is the moral dilemma with privileging the environment over the humanitarian concerns (E. Ben-Yemini, personal

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[4] Known in Hebrew as Adam Teva V'Din
[5] An Israeli NGO that refers to itself as, "The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories".
[6] UN Resolution A/RES/64/292. United Nations General Assembly, July 2010

interview, May 20, 2012). This dilemma posed a significant challenge to the agenda of the Green Movement Party when the members were unable to reach a consensus on their position regarding the Barrier. As a result of this stalemate, members of the organization resigned, including Ben-Yemini, because they believed that the Party should be responding to the Barrier in a different way. This is a common problem among environmentalists where the union of vision, values and policy has often been elusive (Shellenberger & Nordhaus, 2004).

   Other environmental movement members have pointed to the prevalence of human rights groups in the region as justification for continuing to pursue an environmental agenda. Carmit Lubanov, the executive director of the Association for Environmental Justice in Israel, expressed the opinion that the presence of human rights groups leverages the environmental community to fulfill their purpose of working for nature conservation (C. Lubanov, personal interview, May 15, 2012). Her point is further elucidated by the fact that environmental concerns and humanitarian issues are not mutually exclusive. In fact, it is often pointed out that, "environmental injustice and human rights violation are inextricably interlinked, and the former should be recognized as a major component of the latter" (Adeola, 2000). When viewed in this light, this presents the springboard for the idea of cooperative work between environmental and human rights organizations. The ability to transcend the stigma that humanitarian concerns must be addressed separately, or above, environmental concerns may provide the necessary perspective in order to effectively respond to the Barrier's environmental imposition (Meadows, 2009).

   Additional complications in working with human rights organizations arise from a framework standpoint (S. Sadeh, personal interview, July 30, 2012). For example, human rights groups explained the removal of olive trees for Barrier construction as a decrease in the financial income for Palestinian farmers. However, in same scenario could be argued in an environmental framework. The removal of olive trees has the potential to lead to soil degradation, mass wasting or flooding. If the two groups were to cooperate they could substantiate an argument against the removal of olive trees as both an environmental risk and human rights violation.

This approach has garnered relative success in other instances. Human rights violations and environmental inequality remain a serious threat in the global commons (Adeola, 2000). Therefore, human rights organizations, such as Human Rights Watch, have been recognized for reshaping conditions and human rights practices in many countries (Wapner, 1995). However, the validity of this model in the Israeli paradigm is still unknown. Particularly because it has been claimed that the success of the environmental movement in Israel is partially due to the disinterest in human rights work (E. Shwartz, personal interview, May 15, 2012).

The Public Relations Argument

The public relations argument is founded on the premise that addressing the Barrier, or operating beyond the Green Line, could be inferred as political activity and result in negative public relations. As one of the longstanding civil society movements in Israel, it is not surprising that the environmental movement is stratified. Despite the diversity of organizations, most have adopted an "apolitical" stance in their mission statements. However, this has been described as one of the gravest mistakes environmental activists commit (De-Shalit, 2001). The idea that an environmental campaign must be apolitical in order to draw public support is contradictory to research regarding those who join public activism. This is further illustrated when analyzing environmental NGOs in Israel and their political relations.

SPNI has a historical connection with the kibbutzim of the country, which are typically aligned as politically left. The membership of SPNI has been classified as predominately middle-class suburban Israeli, most of whom generally vote for left-of-center parties (Tal, 2002). This membership trend is reflected in most other environmental organizations in Israel, which have a typically left orientation (E. Ben-Yemini, personal interview, May 20, 2012). This political disposition is part of the reasoning for why the environmental movement has garnered more success in reaching out to Israel's Arab citizens over other Israeli organizations (C. Lubanov, personal interview, May 15, 2012).

Many of the environmental organizations have expressed apprehension that work regarding the Barrier will be viewed as peace work, or politically leftist, and this could alienate their membership (Lane, 1995; Tal, 2002). Additionally, the potential of being

perceived as a peace-work organization threatens the political clout the green movement has attained (E. Shwartz, personal interview, May 15, 2012). Public opinion is of vital importance to environmentalists because it where the movement draws a large part of its direction and support from, including the majority of its financial backing (Shellenberger & Nordhaus, 2004). This argument asserts that the possible loss of power/finances is enough to dissuade the green movement from engaging in activities beyond the Green Line.

However, research has shown that people join a campaign based on if they believe the cause to be just or not, and not based on its political affiliation (De-Shalit, 2001). In the case of the Barrier, the environmental impacts felt by its construction are not limited to the West Bank, but can be felt within Israel as well. Rationalizing the impacts as a transnational issue makes the problem an environmental injustice dispute. Therefore, addressing these impacts would fall within the framework of the Israeli environmental agenda, regardless of political orientation (Shellenberger & Nordhaus, 2004).

Additional motivation supporting the public relations argument is that the environmental movement in Israel is currently experiencing a paradigm shift (Tal, 2011; E. Schwartz, personal interview, May 15, 2012). The paradigm change, it is argued, is reflective of the fact that there has yet to be a full matriculation of environmentalism into the nationalist narrative. Therefore the green movement does not have the maturity, or the moral strength, with which to make claims regarding the Green Line. Under these auspices it is argued that environmental concerns have not made it to the forefront of the public's agenda, and environmentalism has not been adopted as part of the Zionist identity. It its therefore the opinion of the green movement leaders that they must first establish environmentalism as part of the mentality of the country before moving to more controversial issues such as the Barrier (A. Tal, personal interview , July 22, 2012).

The final premise in conjunction with public relations is the issue of agenda setting. In an interview with Alon Tal, founder of the IUED and current chairman of the Green Movement Party, he articulated the proclivity of the environmental movement to avoid highly contentious agenda items (A. Tal, personal interview, July 22, 2012). He expressed that the environmental movement's current platform has yet to address all localized concerns, including the Dimona Nuclear Reactor, due to the politicized nature

of the problems. However, this philosophy is counter-intuitive to the stated purpose of the environmental movement. As previously stated, the principle of the environmental movement is to provide the necessary information in order to frame the political discussion (Shellengberger & Nordhaus, 2004). A majority of the current political discussion revolves around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As long as the conflict is being debated, the effects that conflict is having on the environment should be factored into the discussion.

The Transformative Argument

The transformative argument is based on the idea that the green movement cannot operate in the West Bank in the same manner that it does on the Israeli side of the Green Line. Inherent within this statement is that the green movement does not in fact stop at the Green Line. Support for this argument can be seen in the work of SPNI, IUED, Friends of the Earth Middle East (FoEME), and other organizations.

The SPNI was one of the first organizations to engage in work beyond the Green Line. Their operation of the Gilo Field School in the West Bank is evidence of their operation beyond the Green Line[7]. However the work conducted at the field school differs from the activities SPNI engages in within Israel, it tends to have a more religious connotation. This is explanatory of their attempt to appeal to a specific audience, and the political parameters of operating beyond the Green Line. According to transnational advocacy theory, this behavior complies with the idea that a movement is dynamic rather than static (Della Porta, 2005). A movement should change its features to reflect the interest, identities and boundaries in which they are operating. By opening these channels for alternative visions, the global environmental movement has traditionally held international success.

One assertion for why the transformative argument occurs is that managing environmental issues beyond the Barrier is more complicated (C. Lubanov, personal interview, May 15, 2012). Ms. Lubanov asserts that there exists the potential for numerous lawsuits and campaign, but getting Israelis and Palestinians to cooperate and navigate through the legal parameters is more complicated. For this reason, the environmental movement cannot manifest itself in the same capacity it does in Israel.

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[7] The Har Gilo Field School was constructed in 1978, prior to the construction of the Barrier

The transformative argument is also the only argument that accounts for the cooperation with Palestinian environmental organizations. During the "Peace-Era"[8] there was a tremendous amount of cooperation among Israeli and Palestinian environmental groups despite differing environmental narratives (Chaitin, 2004). However, as a result of the outbreak of the Second Intifada, the Barrier's construction, and the restrictions limiting collaboration, these projects have diminished or disappeared.

Recommendation

It is evident that there are numerous issues dissuading the environmental movement from pursuing a campaign beyond the Barrier. The security argument poses one of the greatest hurdles to challenging environmental destruction, and resonates as a logical explanation. When compounded with the humanitarian concern, the idea of working to remediate the damage done by Barrier construction seems near impossible. It is this improbability, and the incongruity with the public relations agenda set forth by the environmental movement, that appears to support the argument that the green movement stops at the Green Line.

However, it is the transformative argument, and the evidence indicating that members of the green movement have challenged the environmental impacts of the Barrier, that indicate the green movement does not stop at the Green Line. Perhaps the movement's presence isn't as powerful as it is in Israeli society, however the transformative argument accounts for the loopholes found within the security, human rights and public relations arguments. The transformative argument accounts

In order for the green movement to have done any work beyond the Green Line, including the contestation of waste disposal or challenging the Barrier's construction in the Judean Desert, the security argument is instantly disproven. While security poses a deep-seated concern, and makes operating on the Palestinian side of the Barrier more complicated, it has not served as a complete deterrence. Therefore, acknowledging that security will pose an additional challenge to the pursuit of action to remediate environmental damages is encompassed within the transformative standpoint.

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[8] Between 1990-2000 there was a relative period of terrorist inactivity

As previously mentioned, the humanitarian and environmental issues are inextricably linked. The humanitarian concerns raised by the Barrier do not exist to the same extent within the Israeli border, therefore in order to address these concerns the movement must acknowledge that the environmental problems have transformed. A transformation of environmental problems translates to a transformation of activity.

The apprehension surrounding public relations is apparent in any civil society movement or organization. Public relations are imperative for the continuation of any movement's success. However, worrying that public relations will diminish because of adopting a political standpoint avoids an opportunity for discourse. Social movements, including environmental, are viewed as a discursive arena "bringing into communication a whole series of environments, of people with a common sense of things they want to change, even if among them the differences are profound" (Della Porta, 2005). Without allowing the opportunity for discussion for fear of politicization, the environmental movement is avoiding the opportunity for advancing their agenda. Additionally, it is clear that this discourse is occurring as members of the Green Movement Party are vacating positions due to this discussion. The environmental movement has clearly acknowledged that the Barrier must be discussed.

Acknowledging that the work of the environmental movement extends beyond the Green Line, although in a different capacity, opens a new opportunity for action. By realizing that the work can continue in a different format a new analysis of opportunities are brought to fruition. For instance, the legal parameters wrought by the Barrier (and by extension the security dilemma) could be navigated in conjunction with the social justice movement, as is done in environmental justice issues (and thus incorporates any concerns raised in the human rights argument). The environmental justice movement argues that there shouldn't be an unfair burden of negative of environmental impacts on a population due to superseding factors, such as race, socio-economic disposition, or geographic location. The environmental justice movement often argues cases that fit these parameters using a combination of environmental science (proving there is a negative environmental impact) and civil rights, thus leveraging their argument through two unique view points. Environmental and social justice criteria are met and exceeded in many instances in the case of the Barrier.

An additional opportunity for action afforded by the transformative argument is the collaborative work with Palestinian environmental groups. Unlike the environmental problems on the Israeli side of the Green Line, a new stakeholder is impacted by the Barrier's existence. In this regard, it appears necessary that the green movement would need to work with a counterpart within the Barrier. The security, human rights and public relations argument failed to address this dynamic. Collaborative work could, as was argued with the environmental justice claim, could help avoid some of the legal parameters limiting the scope of the work the environmental movement would pursue. Palestinian organizations could work within the framework set forth by the Palestinian Authority, and Israeli's could operate within their counterpart. Additionally it has been shown that movements wield more influence when they include "many actors with strong connections and a regular flow of information between them" (Della Porta, 2005). The sharing of information is of particular importance when either actor's (Israeli and Palestinian) behavior can have a serious effect on the environment for the other. Additionally, the Barrier provides a geographic limitation for monitoring environmental quality (such as upstream water pollution, or air toxicity from burning of waste) it is imperative that a continuous flow of information is provided.

Conclusion

The Barrier between Israel and the West Bank has been shown to cause irreparable harm to the environment. The environmental movement's response to the Barrier has been subdued but hasn't been non-existent. The movement has transformed their behavior in order to respond to the unique paradigm the Barrier presents. While the challenges placed by the security, humanitarian and public relations arguments have deferred a strong environmental response to the Barrier, they have not completely inhibited any action.

It is highly recommended that further research should be conducted to analyze the role of the settlements/settlers in the environmental movement's response. Additionally, long term environmental management plans should be looked at for the region, as there is no imminent sign of the Barrier's removal.

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